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I n this essay I propose to discuss the topic of human rights as seen from the standpoint of five doctrines or outlooks that are dominant in our time. I 
don't propose to be fair to these outlooks. Rather, I shall treat them in the form 
of Weberian »ideal types« or caricatures -  a caricature being an exaggerated 
and simplified representation which, when it succeeds, captures the essentials 
of what is represented.
The principle that human rights must be defended has become one of the 
commonplaces of our age. Sometimes the universality of human rights has 
been challenged: those historically proclaimed are said to be Eurocentric and 
to be inappropriate, or only partly appropriate, to other cultures and circum­
stances.1 So alternative, or partly alternative, lists are proposed. Sometimes the 
historic lists are said to be too short, and so further human rights are proposed, 
from the second unto the third and fourth generation.2 Sometimes the appeal to 
human rights, or the language in which it is couched, are said to be unhelpful 
or even counterproductive in particular campaigns or struggles -  in advancing 
the condition and position of women,3 say, or in promoting Third World 
development.4 But virtually no-one actually rejects the principle of defending 
human rights.
So, in some sense, it is accepted virtually everywhere. It is also violated 
virtually everywhere, though much more in some places than in others. Hence 
the pressing need for organisations such as Amnesty International and Helsinki
1 See »La Conception occidentale des droits de l'homme reforce le malentendu avec l'Islam«: un 
entretien avec Mohamed Arkoun, Le Monde, 15 March 1989, p. 2; and the essays in 
Adamantine Pollis and Peter Schwab (eds ) , Human Rights. Cultural and Ideological Perspec­
tives. Praeger, New York, 1979, esp. Ch. 1, pp. 14 sqq.
2 See D. D. Raphael (ed.), Political Theory and the Rights o f  Man, London, Macmillan, 1967.
3 See Elizabeth Kingdom, What's Wrong with Rights? Problems fo r  Feminist Politics o f  Law, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1991.
4 Reginald Herbold Green, Human Conditions and Law -  Some Explorations towards Interac­
tion, Brighton, IDS, 1989, Discussion Paper no. 267.
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Watch. But its virtually universal acceptance, even when hypocritical, is very 
important, for this is what gives such organisations such political leverage as 
they have in otherwise unpromising situations. In this lecture I want to focus 
on the significance of that acceptance by asking: what ways of thinking does 
accepting the principle of defending human rights deny and what way of 
thinking does it entail? I want to proceed in two stages: first by asking: what 
would it be like not to accept the principle? And Second: what would it be like 
to take it seriously? First, then les us ask: what would a world without the 
principle of human rights look like? I would like to invite you to join me in a 
series of thought experiments. Let us imagine a series of places in which the 
principle in question is unknown -  places that are neither utopian nor dystopian 
but rather places that are in other respects as attractive as you like, yet which 
simply lack this particular feature, whose distinctiveness we may thereby hope 
to understand better.
1
First, let us imagine a society called Utilitaria. Utilitarians are public-spirited 
people who display a strong sense of collective purpose: their single and 
exclusive goal, overriding all others, is to maximise the overall utility of all of 
them. Traditionally this has meant »the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest 
Number« (which is the national motto) but in more recent times there have 
been disputes about what »utility« is. Some say that it is the same as »wel­
fare«, as measured by objective indicators such as income, access to medical 
facilities, housing and so on. Others, of a more mystical cast of mind, see it as 
a kind of inner glow, an indefinable subjective state that everyone aims at. 
Others say that it is just the satisfaction of whatever desires anyone happens to 
have. Others say that it is the satisfaction of the desires people ought to have or 
of those they would have if they were fully informed and sensible. Yet others, 
gloomier in disposition, say that it is just the avoidance of suffering: for them 
the »greatest happiness« just means the »least unhappiness«. Utilitarians are 
distinctly philistine people, who are disinclined to see utility in High Culture 
and never tire of citing the proverb that »pushpin is as good as poetry«, though 
there is a minority tradition of trying to enrich the idea of »utility« to include 
the more imaginative sides of life. But despite all these differences, all Utilitar­
ians seem to be agreed on one principle: that what counts is what can be 
counted. The prized possession of every Utilitarian is a Pocket Calculator. 
When faced with the question »What is to be done?«, he or she invariably 
translates it into the question »Which option will produce the greatest sum of 
utility?« Calculating is the national obsession.
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Technocrats, Bureaucrats and Judges are the most powerful people in Utilitaria 
and are much admired. They are particularly adept at Calculating, using state- 
oft-the-art computers of ever-increasing power. There are two political parties 
that vie for power -  the Act Party and the Rule Party. What divides them is that 
the Act Party (the »Actors«) encourages everyone to use their Calculators on 
all possible occasions, while the Rule Party (the »Rulers«) discourages ordi­
nary people from using them in everyday life. According to the Rule Utilitar­
ians, people should live by conventions or rules of thumb that are devised and 
interpreted by the Technocrats, Bureaucrats and Judges according to their 
superior methods of Calculation.
Life in Utilitaria has its hazards. Another national proverb is »Utilitas populi 
suprema lex est«. The problem is that no-one can ever know for sure what 
sacrifices he or she may be called on to make for the greater benefit of all. The 
Rule Party's rules of thumb are some protection, since they tend to restrain 
people from doing one another in, but they can, of course, always be overrid­
den if a Technocrat or a Bureaucrat or a Judge makes a Calculation that 
overrides them. Everyone remembers that famous case at the turn of the last 
century of an army captain from a despised minority group who was tried on a 
charge of treason and found guilty of passing documents to an Enemy Power. 
The captain was innocent of the charge but the Judges and the Generals all 
agreed that the doctrine of »Utilitas populi« must prevail. Some intellectuals 
tried to make a fuss, but they got nowhere. And recently, six people were 
found guilty of exploding a bomb at a time of troubles for Utilitaria caused by 
fanatical terrorists from a neighbouring island. It turned out that the six were 
innocent, but » Utilitas populi« prevailed and the Six stayed in gaol.
These hazards might seem troubling to an outsider, but Utilitarians put up with 
them. For their public spiritedness is so highly developed that they are ready to 
sacrifice themselves, and indeed one another, whenever Calculations show 
this to be necessary.
Let us now visit very different kind of country called Communitaria. 
Communitarians are much more friendly people, at least to one another, then 
are the Utilitarians, but they are like them in their very high degree of public 
spiritedness and collective purpose. Actually »friendliness« is too superficial a 
word to describe the way they relate to one another. Their mutual bonds 
constitute their very being. The cannot imagine themselves »unencumbered« 
and apart from them; they call such a nightmarish vision »atomism« and recoil 
with horror from it. Their selves are, as they say, »embedded« or »situated«. 
They identify with one another and identify themselves as so identifying. 
Indeed, you could say that the Communitarians' national obsession is Identity.
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Communitaria used to be a very gemütlich place, much given to agricultural 
metaphors. Communitarians were attached to the soil, they cultivated their 
roots and they felt a truly organic connection with one another. They particu­
larly despised the Utilitarians' calculative way of life, relying instead on 
»shared understandings« and living according o slowly evolving traditions and 
customs with which they would Identify and by which they would be Identi­
fied.
Since then Communitaria has undergone great changes. Waves of immigration 
and movements of people and modern communications have unsettled the old 
gemütlich ways and created a far more heterogeneous and »pluralistic« soci­
ety. New Communitaria is a true »Community of Communities« -  a patch­
work quilt of sub-communities, each claiming recognition for the peculiar 
value of its own specific way of life. New Communitarians believe in 
»multiculturalism« and practise what they call the »politics of recognition«, 
recognising each sub-community's Identity with scrupulous fairness in the 
country's institutions. Positive discrimination is used to encourage those that 
are disadvantaged or in danger of extinction; quotas ensure that all are fairly 
represented in representative institutions and in the professions. The schools 
and colleges teach curricula that exactly reflect the exactly equal value of 
those communities' cultures and none (and certainly not the old gemütlich one) 
is allowed to predominate.
The new Communitarians feel »at home« in their sub-communities but further 
take pride in being Communitarians who recognise one another's sub­
communitarian identities. But there are problems. One is the »inclusion- 
exclusion problem«: how to decide which sub-communities are included in the 
overall framework and which are not. Some groups get very angry at being 
included in sub-communities which recognise them but which they don't 
recognise; others get angry because they recognise themselves as a sub­
community but are nit recognised by others. Recently, for example, a province 
of Communitaria in which one sub-community forms a majority passed a law 
prohibiting both members of their sub-community and all immigrants from 
attending schools that teach in the language that prevails in the rest of 
Communitaria and in which most of its business and trade are conducted. The 
immigrants in particular are none too pleased. A related problem is the »vested 
interests problem«; once on the official list, sub-communities want to stay 
there for ever and keep others out. Moreover, to get on the list, you have to be, 
or claim to be, an indigenous people or the victims of colonialism, and 
preferably both.
Then there is the »relativism problem«. It is obligatory in Communitaria to 
treat the beliefs and practices of all recognised sub-communities as equally
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valid, or rather, none is to be treated as more or less valid than any other. But 
different sub-communities have incompatible beliefs and some engage in very 
nasty practices, mistreating, degrading and persecuting groups and individu­
als, including their own members. Typically, the definers of sub-communitarian 
identity are men; and their women are sometimes oppressed, marginalised and 
badly abused. Some require that womenfolk to conceal their identities in 
hooded black shrouds. Some practise female circumcision. Unfortunately, 
Communitaria's official relativism must allow such practices to continue un­
molested. Recently, a famous writer from one sub-community wrote a satirical 
novel that was partly about the life of another sub-community's holy religious 
Prophet and Founder. Flotheads from the latter sub-community became wildly 
incensed at what they took to be an insult to their faith and publicly burned the 
book in question, while their fanatical and fiery leader, in the home commu­
nity from which they came, ordered the famous writer to be killed. Other 
writers from other sub-communities all over the world signed petitions and 
manifestos in the famous writer's defence. Communitaria's government dealt 
with this tricky situation in a suitably relativistic way, declaring that the 
practice of writing satirical novels was no more but also no less valid that the 
practice of protecting one's fait against insults.
And finally there is the »deviant problem«. Not all Communitarians fit well 
into the sub-communitarian categories. Recalcitrant individuals have been 
known to reject the category by which they are identified or to pretend that 
they don't belong to it. Some cross or refuse to acknowledge the identifying 
boundaries, and some even reject the very idea of such boundaries. Non-, ex-, 
trans-, and anti- Identifiers are not the happiest people in Communitaria. They 
feel uneasy because they tend to be seen as »not true Communitarians«, as 
disloyal, even as »rootless cosmopolitans«. Fortunately, however, they are 
few and unorganised. Least of all are they likely to form another sub-commu­
nity.
Now I propose to take you to another place which is called Proletaria, so 
called nostalgically, after the social class that brought it into being but has long 
since withered away, along with all other social classes. Proletaria has no state. 
That too has withered away. Indeed, it is not a particular country but embraces 
the entire world. Human and other rights existed in pre-historic times but these 
too have withered away. The Proletariat in its struggle sometimes used to 
appeal to them for tactical reasons, but they are no longer needed in Proletaria's 
»truly human« communist society.
Proletarians leas extremely varied and fulfilling lives. They hunt in the morn­
ing, fish in the afternoon and criticise after dinner, they develop an enormous 
range of skills, and no-one has to endure a one-sided, crippled development, to
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fit into a given job-description or role, or an exclusive sphere of activity from 
which one cannot escape. The division of labour has also withered way: 
people are no longer identified with the work they do or the functions they 
fulfil. No-one is a »such-and-such«: as the prophet Gramsci put it, no-one is 
even »an intellectual«, because everyone is (among all the other things he or 
she is). They organise their factories like orchestras and watch over automated 
machinery, they organise production as associated producers, rationally regu­
lating their interchange with Na-Nature, bringing it under their common con­
trol, under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, human nature, and 
they elect representatives to Communes on an annual basis. As the prophet 
Engels foretold, the government of persons has been replaced by the adminis­
tration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The distinc­
tion between work and leisure has withered away; so also has that between the 
private and the public spheres of life. Money, according to the prophet Marx, 
»abases all the gods of mankind and changes them into commodities« and has 
»deprived the whole world, both the human world and nature, of their own 
proper value«5; but now the whole »cash nexus« too has withered away. Now 
at last, as foretold, »love can only ne exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc.«, 
influence can only be through simulation and encouragement and all relations 
to man and to nature express one’s »real individual life«.6 An arcadian abun­
dance exists in which all produce what they are able to and get what they need. 
People identify with one another but not, as among the Communitarians, 
because they belong to this or that community or sub-community, but rather 
because they are equally and fully human. Relations between the sexes are 
fully reciprocal and prostitution is unknown. In Proletaria there is no single 
dominating obsession or way of living: everyone develops their rich individu­
ality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, free of 
external impediments. There is no longer any contradiction between the inter­
est of the separate individual or the individual family and the interest of all 
individuals who have intercourse with one another.
The only problem with Proletarian life is that there are no problems. For with 
communism, as Marx prophesied, we see
»the definitive resolution o f the antagonism between man and nature and 
between man and man. It is the true solution o f the conflict between existence 
and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom  
and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution o f  the riddle o f  
history and knows itself to be this solution«.1
5 K. Marx, »Bruno Bauer, »Die Fähigkeit der Heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu werden«, 
translated in T.B. Bottomore (ed.), Karl Marx, Early Writings, London, Watts, 1963, p. 37.
6 K. Marx, »Money«, translated in Bottomore (ed.), op. cit., pp. 193-94.
7K. Marx, »Private Property and Communism«, translated in Bottomore (ed.), op. cit., p. 155.
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Yet visitors to Proletaria (from other planets) are sometimes disbelieving of 
what they behold, for they find hard to credit that such perfection could be 
attained and, moreover, maintained without friction. How, they wonder, can 
be planning of production run so smoothly without markets to provide infor­
mation through prices about demand? Why are there no conflicts over allocat­
ing resources? Don't differing styles of living get in each other's way? Aren't 
there personal conflicts, between fathers and sons, say, or lovers? Do Proletar­
ians suffer inner turmoil? No sign of any such problems is visible: Proletarians 
seem able to combine their rich individuality, developing their gifts in all 
directions, with fully communal social relations. Only sometimes does it occur 
to such extra-terrestrial visitors that they may have lost their way and landed 
somewhere else than Earth and that these are not human beings after all.
Human rights are unknown in all the three places we have visited, but for 
different reasons. Utilitarians have no use for them because those who believe 
in them are, by definition, disposed to question that Utilitarian Calculations 
should be used in all circumstances. As the Utilitarian State's founder Jeremy 
Bentham famously remarked, the very idea of such rights is not only nonsense 
but »nonsense on stilts«, for »there is no right which, when the abolition of it is 
advantageous to society, should not be abolished«.8 The Communitarians, by 
contrast, have always rejected such rights because of their abstractness from 
real, living, concrete, local ways of life. As that eloquent Old Communitarian 
speechifier Edmund Burke put it, their »abstract perfection« is their »practical 
defect«, for »the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circum­
stances, and admit of infinite modifications, that cannot be settled upon any 
abstract rule«.9 A no less eloquent New Communitarian, Alasdair MacIntyre 
broadens the attack: »natural or human rights«, he says, »are fictions -  just as 
is utility«. They are like »witches and unicorns« for »eveiy attempt to give 
good reasons for believing that there are such rights has failed«. According to 
MacIntyre, forms of behaviour that presuppose such rights »always have a 
highly specific and socially local character, and ... the existence of particular 
types of social institution or practice is a necessary condition for the notion of 
a claim to the possession of a right being an intelligible type of human 
performance«.10 As for Proletarians, their rejection of human rights goes back 
to the Prophet of their Revolution Karl Marx who described talk of them as
8 J. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, reproduced in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Nonsense on Stilts: 
Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights o f  Man, London and New York, Methuen, 1987, p. 
53.
’ Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, reproduced in Waldron, op. cit., pp. 
105, 106.
10 Alasdair M acIntyre,A fter Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, London, Duckworth, 1981, pp. 65- 
67.
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»ideological nonsense« and »obsolete verbal rubbish«," for two reasons. First, 
they tended to soften hearts in the heat of the class struggle; the point was to 
win, not feel sympathy for class enemies. It was, as Trotsky used to say, a 
matter of »our morals« versus »theirs«;12 and Lenin observed that »our moral­
ity is entirely subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle ... 
To a communist all morality lies in this untitled discipline and conscious mass 
struggle against the exploiters. We so not believe in an eternal morality, and 
we expose the falseness of all the fables about morality«.13 And second, Marx 
regarded human rights as anachronistic because hey had been necessary only 
in that pre-historical era when individuals needed protection from injuries and 
dangers generated out of an imperfect, conflictual, class-ridden world. Once 
that world was transformed and a new world born, emancipated human beings 
would flourish free from the need for rights, in abundance, communal relations 
and real freedom to develop their manifold human powers.
What, then, does our thouht-experimental so far suggest we are accepting 
when we accept the principle of defending human rights? First, that they are 
restraints upon the pursuit of what is held to be »advantageous to society«, 
however enlightened or benevolent that pursuit may be. Second, that they 
invoke a certain kind of abstraction from »specific and socially local« prac­
tices: they involve seeing persons behind their identifying (even their self- 
identifying) labels and securing them a protected space within which to live 
their lives from the inside, whether this be in conformity with or in deviation 
from the life their community requires of or seeks to impose on them. And 
thirs, that they presuppose a set of permanent existential facts about the human 
condition: that human beings will always face the malevolence and cruelty of 
others, that there will always be scarcity of resources, that human beings will 
always give priority to the interests of themselves and those close to them, that 
there will always be imperfect rationality in the pursuit of individual and 
colelctive aims, and that there will never be an unforced convergence in ways 
of life and conceptions of what makes it valuable. In the face of these facts, if 
all individuals are to be equally respected, they will need public protection 
from injury and degradation, and from unfairness and arbitrariness in the 
allocation of basic resources and in the operation of the laws and rules of social 
life. You will not be able to rely on others' altruism or benevolence or
11 Karl Marx, Critique o f  the Gotha Programme in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected  
Works, 2 Vols., Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, vol. 2., p. 25.
12 Leon Trotsky, »Their Morals and Ours«, The New International, June 1938, reproduced in: 
Their Morals and Ours: Marxist versus Liberal Views on Morality. Four essays by Leon 
Trotsky, John Dewey and George Novack. Fourth edition. New York, Pathfinder Press, 1969.
13 V.I. Lenin, »Speech at Third Komsomol Congress, 2 October 1920« in V.I. Lenin, Collected 
Works, 45 vols., Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, vol. 31, pp. 291, 294.
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paternalism. Even if the values of those others are your own, they can do you 
in countless ways, by sheer miscalculation or mistake or misjudgement. Lim­
ited rationality puts you in danger from the will, meaning no less than from the 
malevolent and the selfish. But often the values of others will not be your own: 
you will need protection to live your own life from the inside, pursuing your 
own conception of what is valuable, rather than a life imposed upon you. To do 
so, social and cultural preconditions must exist: thus Kurds in Turkey must not 
be trated as »Mountain Turks« but have their own institutions, education and 
language. Now we can see the sense in which human rights are individualistic 
and the sense in which they are not. To defend them is to protect individuals 
from utilitarian savrifices, communitarian impositions, and from injury, degra­
dation and arbitrariness, but doing so cannot be viewed independently of 
economic, legal, political and cultural conditions and many well involve the 
protection and even fostering of collective goods, such as the Kurdish langiage 
and culture. Fot to defend human rights is not merely to protect individuals. It 
is also to protect the activities and relations that make their lives more valu­
able, activities and relations that cannot be conceived reductively as merely 
individual goods. Thus the right to free expression and communication pro­
tects artistic expression and the communication of information; the right to a 
fair trial protects a well-functioning legal system; the right to free association 
protects democratic trade unions, social movements and political demonstra­
tions, and so on.
2
I turn now to the second stage of my inquiry. What would it be like to take 
human rights, thus understood, seriously? To approach this question, let me 
propose a further thought experiment. Let us now imagine worlds with human 
rights, where they are widely recognised and systematically put into practice.
One place where some people think rights flourish is Libertaria. Libertarian 
life runs exclusively and entirely on market principles. It is located somewhere 
in Eastern Europe or maybe in China in the near future. Everything there can 
be bought and sold; everything of value has a price and is subject to Libertar­
ians' national obsession: cost-benefit analysis. The most basic and prized of all 
their rights is the right to property, beginning with each Libertarian's owner­
ship of himself or herself and extending (as Libertarians like to say) to 
whatever they »mix their labour with«. They own their talents and abilities 
and, in developing and deploying these, Libertarians claim the right to what­
ever rewards the market will bring. They love to tell the story of Wilt Cham­
berlain, the famous basketball player whom thousands are willing to pay to 
watch. Would it be just, they ask, to deprive him of these freely-given rewards 
in order to benefit others?
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They also attach great importance to the right of engaging in voluntary trans­
fers of what they rightly own -  transactions of giving, receiving and exchang­
ing, which they use to the advantage of their families, through private educa­
tion and the inheritance of wealth. There is a very low level of regressive 
taxation which is used only to maintain Libertarian system of free exchange -  
- the infrastructure of the economy, the army and the police, and the justice 
system to enforce free contracts. Compulsory redistribution is prohibited since 
it would violate people's unlimited rights to whatever they can earn. Inequali­
ties are great and growing, based on social class, as well as on differential 
talents and efforts. There is no public education, no public health system, no 
public support for the arts or recreation, no public libraries, no public trans­
port, roads, parks or beaches. Water, gas, electricity, nuclear power, garbage 
disposal, postal and telecommunications are all in private hands, as are the 
prisons. The poor, the ill, the handicapped, the unlucky, and the untalented are 
given some sympathy and a measure of charity, but Libertarians do not regard 
their worsening plight as any kind of injustice, since they do not result from 
anyone's rights being infringed.
No-one is tortured in Libertaria. All have the right to vote, the rule of law 
prevails, there is freedom of expression (in media controlled by the rich) and 
of association (though trade unions cannot have closed shops or call strikes, 
since that would violate others' rights). There is equal opportunity in the sense 
that active discrimination against individuals and groups is prohibited, but 
there is an unequal start to the race for jobs and rewards; the socially privileged 
have a considerable advantage stemming from the social backgrounds. All can 
enter the race but losers fall by the wayside: the successful are fond of quoting 
the national motto : »The Devil take the hindmost!«. The homeless sleeping 
under bridges and the unemployed are, however, consoled by the thought that 
they have the same rights as every other Libertarian.
Are human rights taken seriously enough in Libertaria? I believe the answer is 
no, for two reasons. First, as I said, the basic civil rights are respected there -  
there is no torture, there is universal franchise, the rule of law, freedom of 
expression and association and formal equality of opportunity. Yet the pos­
sessors of these rights are not equally respected; not all Libertarians are treated 
as equally human. To adapt a phrase of Anatole France, those who sleep under 
the bridges have the same rights as those who don't. Though all Libertarians 
have the right to vote, the worst off, the marginalised and the excluded do not 
have equal power to organise and influence political decisions, or equal access 
to legal processes, or an equal chance to articulate and communicate their 
points of view, or an equal representation in Libertarian public and institu­
tional life, or an equal chance in the race for qualifications, positions and 
rewards.
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The second reason for thinking that Libertaria fails to take human rights 
seriously enough relates to the distinctively Libertarian rights. Libertarians 
believe that they have an unlimited right to whatever reward the abilities and 
efforts can bring in the market-place and the unlimited right to make voluntary 
choices that benefit themselves and their families. No Libertarian ever takes a 
step outside the narrowly self-interested point of view of advancing his own, 
or at most his family's, interests. He is impervious to the thought that others 
might have more urgent claims on resources, or that some of his own and his 
family's advantages are gained at the expense of others' disadvantage, or that 
the structure of Libertarian life is a structure of injustice.
Are human rights in better shape elsewhere? Where is the principle of defend­
ing them more securely defended? Where, in other words, are all human 
beings more securely treated as equally human? Where are they protected 
against Utilitarian sacrifices for the advantage of society and against 
Communitarian imposition of a particular way of life, against the Communist 
illusion that a world beyond rights can be attained and against the Libertarian 
illusion that a world run entirely on market principles is a world that recognises 
them fully?
Is Egalitaria such a place? Egalitaria is a one-status society in the sense that all 
Egalitarians are treated as being of equal worth: one person's well-being and 
freedom are regarded as just as valuable as any other's. The basic liberties, the 
rule of law, toleration, equality of opportunity are all constitutionally guaran­
teed. But they are also made real by Egalitarians' commitment to rendering 
everyone's conditions of life such that these equal rights are of equal worth to 
their possessors. They differ about how to do this but one currently influential 
view is that a basic economic and political structure can be created that can 
make everyone better off while giving priority to bettering the condition of the 
worst off: on this view no inequality is justified unless it results in making the 
worst off better off than they would otherwise be. All agree that progressive 
taxation and extensive welfare provision should ensure a decent minimum 
standard of life for all. But there is also within Egalitarian culture a momentum 
towards raising that minimum through policies that gradually eliminate invol­
untary disadvantage. That momentum is fuelled by a sense of injustice that 
perpetually tracks further instances of illegitimate inequality, or involuntary 
disadvantage -  whether these result from religion or class or ethnicity or 
gender, and so on, and seeks policies that will render Egalitarians more equal 
in their conditions of life.
Could there be such a place as Egalitaria? More precisely, is Egalitaria fea­
sible'. could it be attained from anywhere in the present world? And is it 
viable: could it be maintained stably over time? Some doubt that it is feasible.
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Some say that, even if feasible, it is not viable. Some say that it might be 
viable, if it were feasible, but it is not. Others say that it is neither feasible nor 
viable. I fear that there are good reasons for all these doubts. I shall suggest 
two major reasons for doubting the attainability and the maintainability of 
Egalitaria and conclude this lecture by suggesting what they imply about how 
we should view the principle of defending human rights.
The first reason for thinking that Egalitaria may, after all, be a mirage is what 
we may call the libertarian constraint. This is found, above all, in the eco­
nomic sphere. Egalitarians are (or should be) extremely concerned to achieve 
maximal economic growth. For them »equality« is not to be traded off against 
»efficiency«. Rather, they seek most efficiently to achieve an economy that 
will attain the highest level of equality of condition at the highest feasible 
economic level. The worst off (and everyone else) under a more equal system 
should, they hope, be at least as well off as the worst off (and everyone else) 
under a less equal system. If the cost of more equality is lesser prospects of 
prosperity for everyone or most people, their hopes of attaining, let alone 
maintaining, Egalitaria, at least under conditions of freedom, are correspond­
ingly dimmed.
Egalitarians these days are (or should be) keen students of Libertarian eco­
nomics. For one thing, they know what markets can and cannot do14. On the 
one hand, they know when and how markets can fail. Markets reproduce 
existing inequalities of endowments, resources and power, they can generate 
external diseconomies, such as pollution, which they cannot deal with, they 
can, when unchecked, lead to oligopolies and monopolies, they can ravage the 
environment, through deforestation and in other ways, they can produce 
destabilising crises of confidence with ramifying effects, they can encourage 
greed, consumerism, commercialism, opportunism, political passivity, indif­
ference and anonymity, a world of alienated strangers. They cannot fairly 
allocate public goods, or foster social accountability in the use of resources or 
democracy at the workplace, or meet social and individual needs that cannot 
be expressed in the form of purchasing power, or balance the needs of present 
and future generations. On the other hand, they are indispensable and cannot 
be simulated. There is no alternative to them, as a signalling device for 
transmitting in a decentralised process information about tastes, productive 
techniques, resources and so on, as a discovery procedure through which 
restless individuals, in pursuit of entrepreneurial profit, seek new ways of 
satisfying needs and even, as the Prophet Marx himself acknowledged, as an 
arena of freedom and choice. Egalitarians know that command economies can
14 See Samuel Bowles, »What markets can -  and cannot -  do«, Challenge. The Magazine o f  
Economic Affairs, July-August 1991, pp. 11 -  16.
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only fail in comparison with market economies, and they know that, even if the 
market can in various ways be socialised, »market socialism« is, at best, an as 
yet ill-defined hope.
They also know that no economy can function on altruism and moral incen­
tives alone, and that material incentives, and notably the profit motive, are 
indispensable to a well-functioning economy. Most work that needs to be 
done, and in particular entrepreneurial functions, must draw on motives that 
derive from individuals' pursuit of material advantage for themselves and for 
their families. They know, in short, that any feasible and viable economy must 
be based on market processes and material incentives, however controlled and 
supplemented in order to render them socially accountable15 thereby creating 
and reinforcing the very inequalities they earnestly seek to reduce.
The second major reason for scepticism that Egalitaria can be attained and, if 
so, maintained we may call the communitarian constraint. This is to be found, 
primarily, in the cultural sphere. Egalitarians hope that everyone can, at least 
when considering public and political issues, achieve a certain kind of abstrac­
tion from their own point of view and circumstances. Egalitarians hope that 
they can view anyone, including themselves, impartially, seeing everyone's 
life as of equal worth and everyone's well-being and freedom as equally 
valuable. Professor Rawls has modelled such a standpoint in his image of an 
»Original Position« where individuals reason behind a »veil of ignorance«; 
others have tried to capture it in other ways.
Yet Egalitarians must admit that this is not a natural attitude in the world in 
which we live and that it seems in increasingly many places to be becoming 
less and less so. Yugoslavs turn almost overnight into Serbs and Croats. It 
matters urgently to some Czechoslovaks that they are Slovaks and to some 
Canadians that they are Québécois. Even Black or Hispanic or Asian Ameri­
cans are insisting on seeing themselves in politically correct ways. It seems 
that belonging to certain kinds of »encompassing groups« with cultures of self­
recognition, and identifying and being identified as so belonging, is increas­
ingly essential to many people's well-being.16 But, to the extent that this is so, 
the »politics of equal dignity« that would treat individuals equally, irrespective 
of their group affiliations, is put in jeopardy.17
15 See Diane Elson, »The Economics o f  a Socialised Market« in Robin Blackburn (ed.), After the 
Fall. The Failure o Communism and the Future o f  Socialism, London, Verso. 1991.
16 See Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, »National Self-determination«, Journal o f  Philosophy, 
87, 9, Sept. 1990, pp. 441 -4 6 1 .
17 See Multiculturalism and »The Politics o f  Recognition«. An essay by Charles Taylor, with 
commentary by Amy Gutmann (editor), Steven C. Rockerfeller, Michael Walzer and Susan 
Wolf, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992.
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Consider the idea of »fraternity«. Unlike »liberty« and »equality«, which are 
conditions to be achieved, who your brothers are is determined by the past. 
You and they form a collectivity in contradistinction to the rest of mankind, 
and in particular to that portion of it you and they see as sources of danger or 
objects of envy or resentment. The history of »fraternity« during the course of 
the French Revolution is instructive.18 It began with a promise of universal 
brotherhood; soon it came to mean patriotism; and eventually the idea was 
used to justify militancy against external enemies and purges of enemies 
within. The revolutionary slogan »la fratemite ou la mort« thus acquired a new 
and ominous meaning, promising violence first against non-brothers and then 
against false brothers. For collective or communal identity always requires, as 
they say, an »other«; every affirmation of belonging includes an explicit or 
implicit exclusion clause. The Egalitarians' problem is to render such exclu­
sions harmless.
The problem is to attain a general acceptance of multiple identities that do not 
conflict. But how many situations in the present world are favourable to such 
an outcome? The least promising, and most explosive, seems to be that of 
formerly communist federal states containing peoples with historical emnities 
at different levels of economic development. The least unpromising, perhaps, 
are polyethnic societies composed mainly of various immigrant groups who 
demand the right freely to express their particularity within the economic and 
political institutions of the dominant culture. But there too, wherever that right 
is interpreted as a collective right to equal recognition, a threat to egalitarian 
outcomes is raised: that of treating individuals only or mainly as the bearers of 
their collective identities19 and thus of building not Egalitaria but Communitaria.
Here, then, are two major reasons for doubting that Egalitaria can be realised 
anywhere in this world (let alone across it as a whole). They very naturally 
lead those impressed by them to take up anti-egalitarian political positions. 
Indeed they constitute the two main sources of right-wing thinking today — 
libertarian and communitarian. Both point to severe limitations on the capacity 
of human beings to achieve that abstraction or impartial regard that could lead 
them to view all lives as equally valuable.20 Both are sufficiently powerful and 
persuasive to convince reasonable people to reject egalitarian politics.
18 See the entry on »Fraternité« (by Mona Ozouf) in Francois Furet and M ona O zouf (eds.), 
Dictionnaire critique de la Revolution française, Paris, Flammarion, 1988, pp. 731 -  740.
19 See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections o f  an Affirmative Action Baby, New York, Basic Books,
1991 and Will Kymlicka, »Liberalism and the Politicization o f  Ethnicity«, Canadian Journal 
o f  Law and Jurisprudence, 4, 2, July 1991, pp. 239 -  256. Kymlicka makes an interesting 
distinction between two kinds o f cultural pluralism: one associated with multination states, the 
other with polyethnic immigrant societies.
20 See Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality, London, Oxford University Press, 1991.
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How, in the light of this last fact, should we view human rights? I think it 
follows that the list of human rights should be kept both reasonably short and 
reasonably abstract. It should include the basic civil and political rights, the 
rule of law, freedom of expression and association, equality of opportunity and 
the right to some basic level of material well-being, but probably no more. For 
only these have a prospect of securing agreement across the broad spectrum of 
contemporary political life, even though disagreement breaks out again once 
you ask how these abstract rights are to be made concrete: how the formal is to 
become real. Who are the possessors of civil and political rights? Nationals? 
Citizens? Guest-workers? Refugees? All who are residents within a given 
territory? Exactly what does the rule of law require? Does it involve equalising 
access to legal advice and representation? Public defenders? The jury system? 
Equal representation of minorities on juries? The right to challenge jurors 
without cause? When are freedom of expression and association truly free? 
Does the former have implications for the distribution and forms of ownership 
of mass media and the modes and principles of their public regulation? Does 
the latter entail some form of industrial democracy that goes beyond what 
currently obtains? What must be equal for opportunities to be equal? Is the 
issue one of non-discrimination against an existing background of economic, 
social and cultural inequalities or is that background itself the field within 
which opportunities can be made more equal? What is the basic minimum? 
Should it be set low to avoid negative incentive effects? If so, how low? Or 
should there be a basic income for all, and, if so, should that include those who 
could but don't work, or don't accept work that is on offer? And how is a basic 
minimum level of material well-being to be conceived and measured — in 
terms of welfare, or income, or resources, or »level of living« or »basic 
capabilities« or in some other way?
To defend these human rights is to defend a kind of »egalitarian plateau« upon 
which such political conflicts and arguments can take place.21 On the plateau, 
human rights are taken seriously on all sides, though there are wide and deep 
disagreements about what defending and protecting them involves. I hope I 
have convinced you that there are powerful reasons against abandoning it for 
any of the first four countries we have visited.
21 The idea o f the egalitarian plateau is Ronald Dworkin's. See his »What is Equality? Part 1: 
Equality o f  Welfare; Part 2: Equality o f Resources«, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10, 3 -4 , 
1981, pp. 185 - 246, 283 - 345, »What is Equality? Part 3: the Place o f Liberty«, Iowa Law  
Review, 73,1 ,1987, pp. 1 -54, »W hat is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality«, University o f  San 
Francisco Law R eview ,2 2 ,1,1988 ,pp. 1 -3 0 an d ^  М дг/его/Рпиар/е, Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, Harvard University Press, 1985. See also the discussion in Will Kymlicka, Contem­
porary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford, Clarendon, 1990.
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Yet the plateau is under siege from their armies. One of those armies flies a 
communitarian flag and practises »ethnic cleansing.« It has already destroyed 
Mostar and many other places and is currently threatening Kosovo and 
Macedonia. Right now it is laying siege to Sarajevo, slaughtering and starving 
men, women and children and raping women, only because they have the 
wrong collective identity. We are complicitly allowing this to go on, within the 
very walls of modem, civilised Europe. The barbarians are within the gates.
I believe that the principle of defending human rights requires an end to our 
complicity and appeasement: that we raise the siege of Sarajevo and defeat 
them by force. Only then can we resume the journey to Egalitaria, which, if it 
can indeed be reached at all, can only be reached from the plateau of human 
rights.
